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5Abstract
This working paper is a series of reflections based on 
the talking points of an expert panel discussion hosted 
by swisspeace on the 13th of February 2013 entitled 
Acquittal of Gotovina and Haradinaj: A Lost Chance 
for Dealing with the Past in the Balkans? Four experts 
were invited to share their thoughts on the legal as-
pects of the acquittals, the public reactions in Croatia, 
Serbia and Kosovo, and implications for dealing with 
the past in the Balkans. As such it is not intended to 
be an exhaustive analysis of international law or the 
workings of the ICTY, but rather a series of discussion 
points designed to prompt debate on this contempora-
ry event and its wider implications. 
Introduction: The Promises 
and Pitfalls of International 
Justice
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The 2012 acquittals in the cases of Gotovina et al. and Haradinaj et al. at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) brought to the 
surface once again that which has been known and debated for some time: it 
is hard to separate the law and politics. Conventional approaches to transi-
tional justice as an idea and a practice have at their centre a belief in the rule 
of law as a necessary underpinning for democracy and sustainable peace. 
With the rule of law one can end a culture of impunity, hold those accountable 
who have committed crimes against humanity and ensure a legal equality of 
all those who wish to live together in a society following violence, war and 
oppression. But with the law one can also silence, wield power and practice 
prejudice. The law is not only an expression of a society’s aspiration towards 
certain values but is a practice which can be complicated and perceived in 
differing ways by those it seeks to serve. It is thus full of promise to contribute 
to dealing with the past, but contains within it the threat of certain pitfalls 
which could damage those very same processes. 
 The title of this working paper, Acquittal of Gotovina and Haradinaj: A 
Lost Chance for Dealing with the Past in the Balkans?, is a question with a 
certain presumption. This is the presumption that successful prosecution in 
the cases of Gotovina et al. and Haradinaj et al. would, or could, have been 
positive for dealing with the past in the Balkans. We must first understand this 
presumption if we are to understand the reflections which follow and which 
seek to answer the question posed. The ICTY was established in 1993 as an ad 
hoc tribunal with a mandate to “prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991” (United Nations 2004: Article 1 p.5) as part of 
the violence which accompanied the political and territorial dissolution of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Debates and disagreements 
on the history of the Balkans, the nature of this violence, and the relative 
legitimacy of territorial and political claims are extensive (see for example 
Malcom 1994) and not the focus of this paper. However, for the purposes of 
this short introduction it is necessary to highlight some key points. Firstly, the 
violence was a product of an historical legacy of Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian rule, of Communist Federalism and of many centuries of contes-
tation over the nature and boundaries of ethnic and national identities. 
Secondly, the violence was varied according to local context, meaning that not 
one static dynamic of violence or categorisation of ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ 
will adequately describe the range of experiences of harm. And thirdly, the 
position and response of international actors has been shaped by discourses 
of ‘ancient hatreds’ (Jeffrey 2009) and ‘humanitarianism’ (Chandler 2005), 
meaning that the people of the Balkans themselves have often been perceived 
as limited in their autonomy, claim making and ability to shape dealing with 
the past processes. 
 The ICTY was established in this context of high levels of violence and a 
slow response from international actors. According to Jeffrey, there is a 
"moral imagination of the ICTY, in which the past is confronted, documented 
and adjudicated in law" (2009: 396). Set up with a double mission to dispense 
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7justice and foster reconciliation it has been described as having a "messianic" 
mandate (Teitel 1999: 179 & 188). However, the political realities of the context 
in which it has operated have meant initial paralysis due to lack of funds and 
support (Teitel 1999: 184), delayed indictment of key politicians considered 
vital for the peace process (Robertson 2000: 286-7) and accusations of a bias 
against Serbs through its failure to adequately address crimes committed by 
members of other ethnonational groups (Neuffer 2002) (like those cases 
discussed in this working paper). Furthermore the requirements of the law 
lead us to reflect on its ability to fulfil its ambitious goals. The ICTY prioritises 
testimony relating a structured account of a crime rather than a narrative of 
experience (Ibid: 296-300), has the perpetrator as central to its proceedings 
rather than the victim (Estrada-Hollenbeck 2001), and only puts on trial 
specific acts of the accused which fall within that which is legally relevant. 
This means that whilst the ICTY may prosecute certain individuals for certain 
crimes, thereby working against impunity and acknowledging harm done, it is 
not able nor intended to play the role of a forum for the unravelling of the 
multiplicity of experiences, perceptions and expectations that people living in 
the former Yugoslavia have of dealing with the past. Its truth is partial, deter-
mined by the needs of the process rather than the need to restore dignity, 
negotiate identity and shape post war social and political communities (Smith 
2004). 
 It is these complications which we can see woven into the following 
contributions. These written contributions are adapted from the talking points 
of presentations made as part of an expert panel discussion hosted by 
swisspeace on the 13th of February 2013 entitled Acquittal of Gotovina and 
Haradinaj: A Lost Chance for Dealing with the Past in the Balkans? Four 
experts were invited to share their thoughts on the legal aspects of the 
acquittals, the public reactions in Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo, and implica-
tions for dealing with the past in the Balkans. As such it is not intended to be 
an exhaustive analysis of international law or the workings of the ICTY, but 
rather a series of discussion points designed to prompt debate on this 
contemporary event and its wider implications. 
Introduction
8 1 "An attack on civilians or civilian objects 
in the context of crimes against humanity 
is to be understood as acts of violence 
deliberately launched against civilians or 
civilian objects, although with no require-
ment of a particular result caused by the 
attack, as well as indiscriminate attacks 
on cities, towns, and villages" (Gotovina 
et al., 2011: para. 1841).
1
Legal Background and Implications of the 
ICTY Acquittals in the Gotovina et al. and 
the Haradinaj et al. Cases
In November 2012, two judgements rendered by the ICTY provoked intense 
discussions regarding the role of international tribunals in societies of 
transition. These judgements in particular split public reactions: public 
jubilation in Croatia and Kosovo but anger and consternation in Serbia. 
Although the two cases are often bracketed together in the media and in 
public discussions, the context and the legal implications were quite different. 
1.1  Second Instance Acquittal of Ante 
 Gotovina and Mladen Markač
The first acquittal, rendered by the ICTY Appeals Chamber on 16 November 
2012 in the case of Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač (The Prosecutor v 
Gotovina et al., 2012) is the more controversial one. The two Croatian generals 
had been sentenced to 24 and 18 years imprisonment respectively in the first 
instance judgment rendered in 2011, in which the third co-accused, Ivan 
Cermak was already acquitted. Gotovina and Markač were found guilty of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, committed by Croatian armed forces 
during the so- called ‘Operation Storm’ in 1995. With this military operation 
the late Croatian President Franjo Tudjman aimed to regain control over the 
Krajina, a region in southern Croatia that was at that time controlled by 
Serbian militia forces, which had proclaimed the autonomous ‘Republic of 
Serbian Krajina’. During the offensive an estimated 200,000 civilians were 
forced to flee their homes and around 200 people left behind were killed. 
During the military campaign Serbian civilians were ill-treated and killed, their 
houses looted and destroyed. The four towns Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac and 
Gračac were systematically bombed in summer 1995 (The Prosecutor v 
Gotovina et al., 2011).
 The Trial Chamber of the ICTY had found Gotovina and Markač guilty of 
participating in a so called joint criminal enterprise  (Cassese 2007, Ohlin 2007, 
Haan 2005, Ambos 2007), together with members of Croatia’s political and 
military elite, whose common purpose was "the permanent removal of the 
Serb civilian population from the Krajina by force or threat of force" (The 
Prosecutor v Gotovina et al., 2011: para. 2314). Count 1 of the Indictment had 
charged the accused with persecution through "unlawful attacks on civilians 
and civilian objects"(The Prosecutor vs. Gotovina et al., 2008: para. 48). The 
first instance judges’ assessment of the military campaign as unlawful was 
based primarily on the finding that the artillery attacks on the four towns of 
Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac and Gračac were indiscriminate  (Gotovina et al., 
2011: paras. 1911, 1923, 1935, 1943). Interestingly, the judges did not consider 
such indiscriminate attacks to be war crimes, but instead determined them to 
be crimes against humanity (Gotovina et al., 2011: paras. 1840-42).1  In their 
judgement, the Croatian armed forces had deliberately made no distinction 
between military and civilian targets, thus violating one of the most important 
principles of international humanitarian law – namely the distinction between 
military and civilian objects (Gotovina et al., 2011: paras. 1840-42). However, 
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92 According to art. 52 of Protocol I, civilian 
objects shall not be the object of attack or 
of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects 
which are not military objectives and 
attacks shall be limited strictly to military 
objectives. Whereby military objectives 
are objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contri-
bution to military action and whose total 
or partial destruction, capture or neutrali-
zation, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage.
3 Judge Pocar introduced his dissent with 
the following words: "Given the sheer 
volume of errors and misconstructions in 
the Majority’s reasoning and the fact that 
the Appeal Judgement misrepresents the 
Trial Chamber’s analysis, I will not discuss 
everything in detail. Instead, I will limit 
my dissenting opinion to discussing the 
reasons of my disagreement with the three 
most fatal errors in the Majority’s ap-
proach and conclusions [...]". And further: 
"Unfortunately, the paucity of the legal 
analysis in the Majority’s reasoning opens 
more questions than it provides legal 
answers." (Pocar in Gotovina et al., 2012: 
para.14).
4 Judge Agius found: "I simply cannot agree 
with the Majority in holding that the Trial 
Chamber’s reliance on the Impact Analysis 
was so significant that, even considered 
in its totality, the remaining evidence does 
not definitively demonstrate that artillery 
attacks against the Four Towns were unla-
wful" (Agius in Gotovina et al., 2012: para. 
45). 
since the Trial Chamber did not consider these attacks as war crimes but as 
crimes against humanity it applied its own standard to assess the (un)
lawfulness of the attacks. In its assessment of the attacks, the judges 
declared all artillery strikes more than 200 metres away from a military target 
to be illegal (Gotovina et al., 2011: para 1898). Bearing in mind that these 
artillery attacks were taking place in densely populated areas, which is 
already extremely critical from a humanitarian law perspective (Protocol 
Additional I to Geneva Conventions 1949: art. 52)2, the 200 metre standard, 
which does not exist in international humanitarian law, can be seen as rather 
‘generous’ in favour of the attacking forces.
 It is therefore even more surprising that a narrow majority of the appeal 
judges deemed that the application of this 200 metre standard was neither 
justified nor sufficiently substantiated (Gotovina et al., 2012: paras. 60, 61, 68 
& 77). In their opinion, the bombardments could therefore not be regarded as 
prohibited attacks on civilians and civilian targets. As a consequence they 
rejected all the other findings of the trial chamber regarding the unlawfulness 
of the attacks and reversed the Trial Chamber’s finding that the artillery 
attacks on the four towns were unlawful (Ibid.: para. 84) .
 However, two of the five appeal judges did not agree with this majority 
view and expressed fervent dissenting opinions, accusing their colleagues of 
committing serious legal errors (Pocar in Gotovina et al., 2012: para. 2 and 
Agius in Gotovina et al., 2012: paras. 1-4)3. They mainly criticised their 
colleagues’ total dismissal of all the evidence with regard to both the unlaw-
fulness of the attacks4 and the involvement of the two defendants in a joint 
criminal enterprise based on the Majority’s rejection of the 200 metre 
standard (Agius in Gotovina et al., 2012: paras. 47ff). They were very clear in 
their opinion that the Majority had violated the ICTY standard of review on 
appeal and had not carried out a proper de novo review of the facts (Gotovina 
et al., 2012: para. 64), which the Appellate judges had announced (Pocar in 
Gotovina et al., 2012: paras. 9-14). In addition, they seriously criticised the 
Majority’s failure to enter convictions against Gotovina and Markač on the 
basis of alternate modes of liability, in particular for aiding and abetting or 
superior responsibility (Agius in Gotovina et al., 2012: paras. 51-72). Finally, 
both dissenting judges asserted that the Majority’s decision was based on the 
brief argument that any further evidence would only be considered if it were 
evaluated together with the unlawful attacks; attacks whose unlawfulness 
they denied. However, the detailed, well founded 1,340-page judgment of the 
Trial Chamber in 2011 was based on a wide range of other credible evidence, 
such as the minutes of the meeting between Croatia’s political and military 
leaders at Brioni, in which Operation Storm was planned (Gotovina et al., 2011: 
paras. 1970-1996) and evidence related to the policy of the Croatian political 
leadership with regard to the Serb minority and return of refugees and inter-
nally displaced persons (Ibid: paras. 1997-2057), as well as the content and 
purpose of various laws and decrees enacted after Operation Storm, dealing 
with the property of persons who had left the Krajina region (Ibid.: paras. 
2059-2099).
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 5 Milanovic underlines: "Note that people 
in Croatia and Serbia didn’t really care 
about the two generals as individuals; 
what they did care about was about how 
the Tribunal characterized the systemic 
nature of the crimes (or not), and it is here 
that the Appeal Chamber’s decision is 
at its most dramatic. From a unanimous 
Trial Chamber declaring that the highest 
ranks of the Croatian leadership, inclu-
ding President Tudjman, formed a joint 
criminal enterprise with the purpose of 
ethnically cleansing Serbs from Croatia, 
to a divided, 3 to 2 decision by the Ap-
peals Chamber that no reasonable trier of 
fact could have found that JCE to exist on 
the evidence heard by the Trial Chamber." 
6 For further information on the back-
ground and the implications of the jud-
gement see the following article in this 
Working Paper by Nora Refaeil: "Acquittal 
of Ramush Haradinaj And War Crime 
Prosecution in Kosovo" (p. 16-19).
 Therefore, the ill-founded, complete dismissal of a substantiated, 
unanimous judgement of the Trial Chamber by a slim majority of the Appeals 
Chamber on an extremely shaky legal ground prompted confusion amongst 
independent observers (Milanovic 2012).5 In Serbia, this was seen by many as a 
confirmation of the view they had been expressing for years, that the ICTY had 
been established solely to discredit the Serbian side (BBC 2012).
1.2   First Instance Acquittals of Kosovan 
 KLA Commanders
This view was further reinforced by another acquittal of non-Serbian defend-
ants shortly afterwards. On 29 November 2012, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY 
acquitted three former commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): 
Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj (The Prosecutor v Haradinaj 
et al., 2012: para. 29). They were indicted for crimes committed in a KLA camp 
in Gjakovë in 1998.6
 However, the legal grounds and the procedural history of this case are 
completely different from the Gotovina et al. case discussed above. The 
acquittals were preceded by lengthy trial proceedings, during which two of the 
three initial indictees were acquitted in 2008. Upon appeal by the Prosecutor, 
the Appeals Chamber had referred the case back to the Trial Chamber in 2010 
for re-trail. In the view of the Appeals Judges a re-trial was necessary since 
the "Trial Chamber failed to appreciate the gravity of the threat that witness 
intimidation posed to the trial’s integrity" and "to take sufficient steps to 
ensure the protection of vulnerable witnesses and safeguard the fairness of 
the proceedings" by allotting the Prosecution more time to obtain the testi-
monies of threatened key witnesses (Haradinaj et al., 2010: paras. 34-50). The 
repeated acquittal in the re-trial indicates that it was not possible to obtain 
more compelling evidence in the time which had elapsed since the first trial in 
July 2010. The Trial Chamber does not mention in its re-trial judgement 
whether this was due to "the unprecedented atmosphere of widespread and 
serious witness intimidation" that had surrounded the trial (Ibid: para. 34). 
 Witnesses are crucial in international criminal proceedings and witness 
intimidation is therefore fatal for such trials, both at international and 
domestic levels (Council of Europe 2009). However, describing a general 
context of impunity in Kosovo, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Dick Marty, found that  
"[t]he raft of evidence that exists against certain top KLA leaders appears 
largely to account for this reluctance. There were witnesses to the events who 
were eliminated, and others too terrified by the mere fact of being questioned 
on these events" (Council of Europe 2011a).
 There might be certain parallels to be drawn between the two cases, 
particularly with regard to the difficulty of holding senior military or civilian 
Legal Background and Implications of the ICTY Acquittals
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7 On 23 January 2013 the Municipal Court in 
Knin rendered a judgement that the Croa-
tian State must pay compensation to the 
children of Serb victims killed in the village 
of Varivode after Operation "Storm", re-
gardless of the fact that the perpetrators 
are unknown (Ibid.: p. 6 ff). The Croatian 
government was ordered to pay 540,000 
Kuna to the children of the victims (Ibid.). 
decision-makers criminally responsible years after the events took place and 
in relation to the political reactions which the judgements provoked in the 
Balkans. In other respects, however, the two cases have little in common.  
I would also counter the argument that the ICTY Prosecutors did not act 
diligently: in the Gotovina/Markač case, five out of eight judges found that 
there was numerous convincing evidence for a reasonable trier to convict the 
accused. On the other hand, in the trial against Haradinaj and other KLA 
commanders it was apparently impossible to obtain enough credible evidence, 
probably partly because of the contextual difficulties within and outside 
Kosovo.
1.3  Implications for Reconciliation in the Balkans
It remains to be seen what effect these verdicts will have on dealing with the 
past efforts in Former Yugoslavia. There is reason to believe that they will have 
a negative impact on the urgently needed judicial cooperation between the 
criminal prosecution authorities of the former Yugoslav states. Such cooper-
ation is essential for the prosecution of war crimes trials at the domestic level. 
Cooperation between Serbian and Croatian authorities was already 
threatened by the new Law on invalidation of certain legal acts of the judicial 
bodies of the Former Yugoslav National Army, the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (OG 124/11) from November 
2011 (Human Rights Committee 2012), currently under review by the Croatian 
Constitutional Court before the Gotovina et al. verdict (European Commission 
2013). However, at the time of writing, the pressure on Croatia with regard to 
the preparation of the accession to the EU seems to be more influential than 
the ICTY verdict (Ibid.). As regards non-criminal proceedings, which can be as 
important for victims as penalizing the perpetrators, there was only one case 
of reparations paid to the family of victims of Operation Storm7 – almost 20 
years after the killings.
 However, no sentence and one case compensated is not enough for the 
numerous victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by 
Croatian and Kosovar troops and armed groups. The recent verdicts of the 
ICTY show again how important domestic prosecutions are – after all, interna-
tional justice cannot be more than complementary to national justice. If this 
were the case, acquittals before an international tribunal might have a 
different level of impact.
 Another important aspect is how such verdicts may be perceived by the 
victims. The very fact that war crimes and crimes against humanity were 
committed was not denied by any of the judges. Although the ICTY judges 
confirmed the facts in each case, nobody has been brought to justice – and it 
is likely that nobody will be brought to justice for those crimes, since no 
criminal proceedings for war crimes are expected to take place at the 
domestic level either in Kosovo or in Croatia – in particular not after the two 
acquittals by the ICTY.
Legal Background and Implications of the ICTY Acquittals
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2.1  Introduction
In Croatia there was hardly any verdict more expected than that in the case of 
Gotovina et al. Even today Croatian society is still facing an on-going memory 
struggle, given the complex character of the war. The destruction of Vukovar 
and ethnic cleansing of about one third of Croatian territory and war crimes 
committed by members of the Serbian forces with the support of the Yugoslav 
Army in the year 1991, mostly against Croats, are well known. However, crimes 
committed by members of the Croatian forces mostly against ethnic Serbs, in 
particular during and after two military actions in May and August 1995, have 
remained less visible. Where many public figures strive to prove that the war 
was ‘defensive’, ‘liberating’, ‘just’ and 'legitimate’, it remains hard to publicly 
declare that it also had some characteristics of a civil war.
 Facts on the number of victims are still disputed. Concerning the 
number of victims of war crimes during and in the aftermath of Operation 
Storm, the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (CHC) recorded 677 
civilian victims and about 20 000 destroyed buildings (burned down or 
destroyed) in the area which was liberated by military action. Unlike the CHC 
records, the State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia (DORH) is in 
possession of information concerning 214 persons killed, out of which 167 
were killed as victims of war crimes and 47 as victims of murder. When 
explaining these substantially different figures, DORH states that very often 
no distinction is made between victims of murder and victims of war crimes 
– in respect of which there is no criminal liability for their killing/death by the 
warring sides (Documenta 2012: 31). 
 Concerning criminal proceedings in Croatia, the families of victims are 
disappointed. So far, not a single person has been convicted for the war 
crimes committed during and after Operation Storm. There have been 3 
criminal proceedings before Croatian courts against 10 persons for war crimes 
committed during and after Operation Storm. Proceedings for the killing of six 
elderly Serbian civilians in Grubori during Operation Storm, which was also 
mentioned in an indictment and first level verdict at the ICTY, are on-going. 
Similarly, proceedings for the killing of an elderly Serbian couple in Prokljan 
and one prisoner of war in Mandići have not yet been closed. In 2001 an 
investigation on the killing of three civilians in Laškovci and Dobropoljci was 
carried out, however, the prosecution dropped charges due to lack of 
evidence. It is in this context that calls for justice remain and it is important to 
reflect on the acquittals of Gotovina et al. and local reactions to them.
2.2  Significance of the acquittals and local reactions
The acquittals of Gotovina and Markač triggered euphoria amongst the vast 
majority of the public in Croatia. Formerly widespread claims of the ICTY being 
‘anti-Croatian’ were replaced with statements that with the acquittal of the 
Croatian generals ‘the War for Homeland has finally ended’ and that ‘Croatia 
2
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has regained its innocence’. Thus, the complex reality of war in which notions 
of a defensive war have been mixed with elements of civil war has been 
painted in simplified black and white colours, attributing all evil and all harms 
done to one side only. Euphoric Croats waved national flags and held up 
photos of the generals alongside banners reading "Pride of Croatia", while 
patriotic songs blasted from speakers (Boris Pavelić in Balkan Insight). In 
response, human rights organisation Documenta has issued a statement, 
emphasizing the need to bear in mind the victims’ families and warning that 
we must not let the crimes committed during Operation Storm remain a 
tragedy without an epilogue (Documenta 2012).
 During Operation Storm, hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands 
of houses and other objects were burnt down. In addition, almost half of the 
refugees that fled during the operation are still waiting to return to their 
homes (according to UNHCR data, 132’922 persons have returned to Croatia, 
out of which 48 percent returned permanently, while the rest only occasionally 
visit their former homes). According to the information gathered by different 
international organizations, some 200’000 Croatian citizens of Serbian nation-
ality escaped to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the former Socialist Republic 
of Yugoslavia after Croatian army actions in the former sectors West, North 
and South in the summer of 1995. 
 Regardless of the verdict by the Appeals Chamber in the cases against 
Gotovina and Markač, families of victims have a moral right to expect that 
perpetrators are held responsible, according to the view of Documenta, no 
matter whose side the perpetrators were on during the war and no matter in 
whose names the crimes were committed. We would like to highlight once 
again that there are crimes known by the Croatian authorities and the public 
which have never been prosecuted, including the killings of civilians in Golubić, 
Gošić, Varivode and Mokro Polje in the Knin area, the attack on a refugee 
convoy between Glina and Dvor resulting in the death of a large number of 
civilians, and the murders in Komić in the Korenica area, among others. Some 
of these crimes have been processed, but the final verdicts of the trials are 
slow to arrive.
 President Josipović and Prime Minister Milanović expressed their 
enthusiasm about the acquittals. However they both pointed out in their first 
public addresses that crimes have been committed during and after Operation 
Storm and that the Croatian judiciary should prosecute the perpetrators. In 
Serbia, the acquittals of the Croatian generals stirred up quite the opposite 
reaction. Understandably, the acquittals left the victims deeply frustrated and 
with a feeling of injustice. However, the leading politicians were appalled by 
the news of the acquittal of Gotovina and Markač. Their assessment was that 
the ICTY had held a political and anti-Serbian trial. They criticised the Croatian 
authorities and reduced cooperation with the ICTY to a technical minimum 
(Documenta 2013).
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 Zoran Pusić, President of the Civic Committee for Human Rights, has 
pointed out: "At the moment, Croatia should call for an initiative to calm down 
the situation, redress the wrongdoings and give equal attention to all war 
crimes. The Serbian side feels damaged by what they perceive as a funda-
mental injustice – not so much due to the acquittal of Gotovina and Markač 
itself but much more with the implications arising from the judgment. The 
judgment implies that crimes against Serbian victims were insignificant and 
that farmers left their homes, property and livestock and embarked on years 
of refugee life out of spite almost. It is easy to act smart and superior now 
saying that the main problem lies with the Serbs and Serbian politicians and 
their inability to face the truth of Serbia being the aggressor. But let’s just 
imagine for a moment the scope of bitter and irrational reactions that would 
have emerged from the Croatian public and the politicians had the Appeals 
Chamber’s fine majority tilted the balance towards the other side. This is not 
an important football match where one team won on penalties or got awarded 
a dubious penalty. This is the moment when the choice of actions to a large 
degree might determine the future relations in the region, especially between 
Croats and Serbs (for the most individuals that are still not seeing these 
relations as a private matter). I hope it is not too much to expect from both 
Croatian and Serbian politicians to show a higher level of rationalism than that 
demonstrated by football fans. I hope they will show rationality and empathy 
that have always been lacking in this region. In this case, when one has to keep 
in mind that the world is sometimes much more complex than it seems, these 
two values have been most clearly shown by Gotovina himself" (2012).
2.3  Implications for the future in terms of dealing  
 with the past
Concerning compensation to the families of the victims, some hope for justice 
can be seen in a recent court decision. At the Municipal Court in Knin, a 
judgment was passed on 23 January 2013, stating that the Republic of Croatia 
must pay reparation payments of 540,000.00 KN to Jovan Berić and his sisters 
Branka Kovač and Nevenka Stipišić, whose parents Radivoje Berić and Marija 
Berić were killed in the village of Varivode at the end of September 1995, more 
than 45 days after the end of Operation Storm.
 Initially, the courts in Knin and Šibenik rejected the claims for resti-
tution, which were lodged by the plaintiffs in 2006. However, in January 2012 
the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia quashed the judgements passed 
by the lower instance courts and remanded the cases for retrial. In the expla-
nation of the Supreme Court’s ruling, it was stated that the father and mother 
of the plaintiffs had been killed by firearms in the courtyard of their family 
home and that another 9 elderly persons of Serbian ethnicity had been killed 
in the village on the same day that the plaintiffs’ parents had been killed, that 
the case represented a terrorist act with the aim of causing fear, terror and 
insecurity among civilians, for which act the Republic of Croatia is held 
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accountable and that the obligation of paying the damage restitution 
did exist regardless of the fact of whether the perpetrator of the crime 
himself has been convicted or not (Documenta 2013). 
 Finally, the courts have held accountable the Republic of Croatia 
for non-punishment of perpetrators of the cruel killings in Varivode. 
This judgement brought, at least, a partial satisfaction to family 
members of those killed, and it helped to restore citizens’ trust in the 
Croatian judicial system (Documenta 2013).
 The State Attorney’s Office of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Serbian Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor have requested the ICTY’s 
documentation in the case of Gotovina et al., However, it is feared that, 
due to inefficiency in prosecution of these crimes thus far, but also 
due to the weakening of international political pressure resulting from 
the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union, the 
Croatian judiciary will not pursue prosecutions for the war crimes 
committed during and after Operation Storm to any significant degree. 
It is vital that the Croatian judiciary takes full responsibility for the 
prosecution of war crimes committed as part of Operation Storm and 
for the Croatian government to secure reparations to civilian war 
victims.
 Thinking beyond this justice gap we can also say that there is a 
need for more than retributive justice through the verdicts of domestic 
and international courts. Victims and their families expect acknowl-
edgment of their suffering and new generations have the right to learn 
history based on facts. There has been hardly any progress concerning 
either material or symbolic reparations for the victims and survivors of 
the war crimes. In Varivode the only acknowledgement which the 
victims have received thus far is the erection of a monument dedicated 
to Serbian civilian victims in 2010. One must then ask, regarding 
dealing with the past, whether more monuments will follow and 
whether the Ministry of Justice will consider implementing an inclusive 
reparations policy involving all civilian war crime victims. 
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Acquittal of Ramush Haradinaj 
and War Crime Prosecution in 
Kosovo
3.1  ICTY’s Double Acquittal
In 2005 Ramush Haradinaj, former commander of the KLA in Dukagjin area, 
together with Idriz Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj, were charged as members of a 
joint criminal enterprise or, alternatively, under other modes of individual 
criminal responsibility, with war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly 
committed by them or by other members of the KLA in 1998 against Kosovo 
Serbs, Kosovo Roma/Egyptian, Kosovo Albanian or other civilians in a 
compound of the Kosovo Liberation Army in the village of Jabllanicë/Jablanica 
in Gjakovë/Đakovica municipality (Prosecutor v Haradinaj/Balaj/Brahimaj 
2005). When the ICTY indictment was issued, Haradinaj stepped down immedi-
ately from his position as Prime Minister and - as opposed to Karadžić, Mladić 
and other war crime fugitives - submitted himself voluntarily to the custody of 
the court. 
 In April 2008, the Trial Chamber acquitted Haradinaj of all charges 
(Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al., 2008). But on 21 July 2010, the Appeals Chamber 
partially quashed the acquittals and ordered a partial re-trial. The Appeals 
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had failed to take sufficient steps to 
counter the witness intimidation that permeated the trial, in particular, to 
facilitate the Prosecution’s request to secure the testimony of two witnesses. 
According to the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber’s error undermined the 
fairness of the proceedings and resulted in a miscarriage of justice (Prose-
cutor v Haradinaj et al., 2010).
 On 29 November 2012, the Trial Chamber acquitted Ramush Haradinaj of 
all charges. The judges stated that while crimes had occurred, they found no 
evidence that Ramush Haradinaj had directly participated in the crimes or 
could be held criminally responsible. Rather, they said, there was evidence 
showing that he had tried to prevent crimes by his underlings stating to them 
"no such thing should happen anymore because this is damaging our cause" 
(Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al., 2012). 
 Upon his return to Kosovo, Haradinaj was received by the Prime Minister 
Hashim Thaci at the airport and welcomed by more than 100,000 people 
celebrating his acquittal. Addressing crowds, Haradinaj stated that his 
acquittal also meant "our struggle was just and clean". He also said "Our 
people have gone through great suffering, and now my plan is to become prime 
minister of Kosovo and build our society and economy for all Kosovans – 
Albanian, Serb, Roma, everyone" (Vulliamy 2012).
3.2  The Conflict
In 1998, after almost a decade of systematic human rights violations primarily 
by the Serbian police, an armed conflict erupted between the KLA and Serbian 
military, police, and paramilitary forces operating under Milosevic. The 
fighting resulted in massacres and massive expulsions of ethnic Albanians 
Nora Refaeil
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and ended formally with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) inter-
vention in June 1999. It is assumed that the number of the killed, fallen and 
missing persons in Kosovo from 1998 until the end of 2000 is around 13,146 
(10,495 Albanians, 2,077 Serbs, 186 Roma, 388 other) (Humanitarian Law 
Centre). By the end of December 2011, the total number of missing persons in 
Kosovo stood at 1790, out of which 1299 are Kosovo-Albanians (1134 males, 
165 females) and 499 Non-Albanians (393 males, 106 females) (EULEX/DFM 
2011).
 Today, more than 10 years after the end of the conflict, the population 
still suffers under poverty, lack of opportunity and lack of access to basic 
services. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
Human Development Report these problems "spring from decades of social 
fractures, repression and power imbalances. They include gender discrimi-
nation, ethnic enclaves, corruption, nepotism, income inequalities and deep 
rural-urban divides" (UNDP Kosovo Human Development Report 2012).
According to the latest UNDP led survey on the perceptions of transitional 
justice (UNDP 2012), the communities in Kosovo state that it is very important 
for justice that all war crime perpetrators are punished for the crimes 
committed. At the same time, they are more reluctant than in 2007 to think of 
perpetrators of war crimes as criminals. 
 Behind this background and in view of the hard struggle to meet daily 
needs, the subject of justice has a very specific meaning in Kosovo. Acknowl-
edging and addressing war crimes committed by Albanians during their 
liberation war will not be a priority for the Albanian community as long as 
Serbia politically denies the acknowledgement of responsibility for the crimes 
committed against the Albanians and undermines Kosovo’s newly independent 
statehood. It is thus clear that the pursuit of justice in this regard is the 
responsibility of the international community.
3.3  War Crime Prosecutions and the Public Reaction
While the strategy of the ICTY Office of the Prosecution was to focus on "high 
level, civilian, police and military leaders, of whichever party to the conflict 
who may be held responsible for crimes committed during the armed conflict 
in Kosovo" (ICTY 1999: para. 3), it was made clear that the primary investi-
gative and prosecutorial responsibility would lie with the United Nations 
Interim Administration Mission for Kosovo (UNMIK) (ICTY 1999: para. 6) until 
the point at which European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) 
became operational in early 2009.
 Up until December 2012, the ICTY had indicted a total of 14 individuals, 
both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, for crimes committed in Kosovo. Of this 
total, cases against five individuals have been completed and two cases are at 
the appeals stage. The trial against Haradinaj is particularly politically signif-
icant in that it was the first proceeding against a high level Kosovo Albanian. 
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 By December 2008, only approximately 40 war crime cases had been 
completed in Kosovo courts (Amnesty International 2012:16) while UNMIK 
handed over to EULEX approximately 1,187 acts of suspected war crimes with 
an additional 50 cases which had already been referred for indictment (United 
Nations 2009). Today, EULEX seems to have around 700-750 open war crime 
cases subject to further investigation. Against this background, there is broad 
consensus that the international community has failed to establish justice in 
Kosovo and that a culture of impunity still prevails today (Amnesty Interna-
tional 2012:18).
 While the first trial against Haradinaj et al. was conducted under the 
impression of massive witness intimidation, this was less the sense in the 
second trial. Nonetheless, today witness intimidation is seen as one of the 
major obstacles to establishing responsibility for crimes committed during 
and after the conflict in Kosovo. Beyond witness intimidation, the underlying 
causes for the high number of unresolved war crime cases, crimes against 
humanity including rapes and enforced disappearances, as well as other 
inter-ethnic crimes are manifold and include: the resolving of war crime cases 
not being a priority, lack of political will, insufficient resources allocated to 
handling cases, short term appointment of mission personnel without relevant 
experience, insufficient witness protection program (EULEX mandate), lack of 
cooperation with the local stakeholders, lack of protection of local prose-
cutors and members of the judiciary, a weak domestic justice system, inter-
ference by the executive, a legacy of incomplete documentation and lack of 
evidence (Amnesty International 2012, Council of Europe 2011b, OSCE 2010 & 
2012).
 Today, there is unanimous agreement to prioritize corruption and 
organized crime cases. This is the message that EULEX officially and publicly 
sends and to which it allocates the majority of its resources. This is also what 
the broad public requests and supports. In fact, it seems almost as if the 
success or failure of the EULEX mission will be measured by whether the 
mission has successfully combated corruption or not. Confronted by a lack of 
resources and mismanagement on a daily basis, the Kosovo Albanian 
population demands a concerted fight against corruption while at the same 
time they are deeply disturbed by war crime prosecutions against their own 
heroes (Refaeil 2012).
 Contrary to the Ante Gotovina case where he was sentenced to 24 years 
of imprisonment for the first time while the appeals panel at the ICTY found 
him not guilty, Ramush Haradinaj was acquitted twice. These verdicts of the 
ICTY have to be seen as judgments based on the rule of law and as such, they 
bring an end to open allegations regarding Ramush Haradinaj’s personal 
involvement in war crimes; crimes which according to the ICTY did occur in 
Kosovo. However, there are three unsettling circumstances which relate to the 
broader context of establishing justice in Kosovo. Firstly, the internal fights 
within the prosecution office of the ICTY as to whether or not it was appro-
priate to indict Ramush Haradinaj. What is particularly concerning is that 
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 8 The former Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Lord Madonald of River Glaven QC said in 
an interview with the Observer: "This pro-
secution was a stupid attempt to equate 
resistance with aggression. (…)". The Ob-
server, 2 December 2012, http://www.gu-
ardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/02/ramush-
haradinaj-kosovo-acquitted; see also 
Geoffrey Nice’s statement in B92: http://
www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.
php?yyyy=2008&mm=04&dd=10&nav_
id=49282.
9 In 2011 and 2012, the author of this article, 
during her mandate as the Special Adviser 
on Dealing with the Past with the Interna-
tional Civilian Office in Kosovo, conducted 
workshops on truth-seeking, reparations, 
criminal justice and reconciliation with a 
variety of stakeholders including Albanian 
and Serbian civil society representatives 
and members of victims’ families.
many of their arguments have taken place in the public sphere and thus have 
the potential to undermine the credibility not only of the prosecution office 
but also of the effort to establish post-conflict justice as such.8 Secondly, 
witness intimidation is still a reality in Kosovo as well as a major obstacle to 
justice (Council of Europe 2011). And thirdly, any endeavour to deal with past 
crimes committed by Albanians during the conflict is seen as an untenable 
attack against the legitimacy of the liberation war and its heroes. It is not 
broadly accepted by Kosovo Albanians that a judicial review of alleged crimes 
committed in a conflict and the adjudication of individual responsibility should 
remove the appearance of collective guilt and undermine the legitimacy of the 
cause.
3.4  Dealing with the Past
What is clear is that not dealing with war crimes, or dealing with them inappro-
priately, is a huge obstacle to overcoming the past and also to inter-ethnic 
reconciliation as members of the victim’s families have stated over and over 
again. Several separate workshops with Albanian and Serbian victims and 
their families showed that open war crime cases perpetuate despair, anger, 
bitterness and a sense of victimhood.9 It is also the case that they can 
undermine trust in the Kosovo executive and justice institutions and the 
international community’s presence for supporting the transition in Kosovo. 
The Kosovo Albanian victims are deeply frustrated by the fact that it is almost 
impossible to bring Serbian perpetrators to justice in Kosovo. At the same 
time Serbian families of victims ask how they can rely on institutions which 
refuse to deal with crimes committed against their loved ones. In separate 
meetings, members of both communities set the same fundamental prerequi-
sites for reconciliation: to learn what happened to their deceased/missing 
family members, to establish responsibility of the perpetrators and to ensure 
reparations. It was in particular women who demanded justice in the 
workshops because they are still suffering from gender-based violence while 
the discussion of their human rights violations in society is still a taboo. 
 The ICTY judgment has removed the charges against the accused and 
specifically has acquitted Ramush Haradinaj – one of the most important 
figures in the Kosovo Liberation War. But the court also stated that crimes did 
happen. The ICTY and the EULEX led war crime trials could be taken as an 
opportunity to deal with what happened during the conflict. Haradinaj stated 
that he wants to be the prime minister of all Kosovans. Any person who aspires 
to represent Kosovo’s inhabitants will have to clearly demonstrate that 
dealing with the past without taboos with regard to war crime justice is a 
necessary step towards establishing the rule of law. Further, this person will 
need to show that meeting the needs of the victims irrespective of their 
ethnicity and with a gender-sensitive lens is crucial for aiming towards a 
reconciled society and a just and lasting peace.
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4  
"There is no Justice without Injustice"
Three propositions on the right to justice 
and some reflections on Dealing with the 
Past in the Balkans after the ICTY 
Gotovina and Haradinaj verdicts
Jonathan Sisson
4.1  First Proposition:  "Not only must Justice be done;  
 it must also be seen to be done."
Many in the legal field will be familiar with this aphorism, coined many years 
ago by Lord Chief Justice Gordon Hewart.10 The phrase refers to an inherent 
tension between the objective and the subjective dimensions of justice - that 
‘justice’ depends not only upon the quality of the legal judgment delivered, but 
also on the perception that the trial proceedings were fair and effective and 
that the judgment itself is just. What it means quite simply is that, whatever 
standard is applied, justice must always be consensual. The credibility and, in 
the end, the legitimacy of the justice system are based on society’s consent to 
the judicial process. This is not to say that the public must agree with every 
decision of the courts or that court decisions must be pleasing to the public.  
It does mean, however, that the public must trust that fairness and equality 
before the law prevail and that, in this sense at least, justice is seen to be 
done. 
 The response in the Balkans to the verdicts in the Gotovina and 
Haradinaj cases has not sustained this view. On the one hand, both the 
governments of Croatia and Kosovo are calling for an independent investi-
gation of the work of Carla del Ponte as former UN Chief Prosecutor, charging 
her with an abuse of power in raising indictments in the two cases. In Serbia, 
on the other hand, the verdicts have called forth protest not only on the part of 
the government, as might be expected, but also from civil society organiza-
tions normally supportive of the ICTY. For example, the Humanitarian Law 
Center (HLC) (in ReCom Initiative Voice 2012: 9) issued a statement which read: 
"The ICTY’s final judgment in the trial of General Gotovina and General Markač 
has brought no justice to the victims. The decision of the Appeals Chamber 
establishes no responsibility on the part of the Republic of Croatia for the 
crimes committed during and after Operation Storm and no joint criminal 
enterprise, or even individual responsibility on the part of the generals has 
been established." The HLC (Ibid.) statement concludes with the critical 
assertion: "This judgment reduces the mass crimes committed during and 
after the military-police Operation Storm to isolated incidents. From now on, 
no one will criticize the Croatian authorities for their reluctance or failure to 
prosecute the war crimes committed against Serbs."
10 Lord Justice Gordon Hewart, in: Rex v. Sus-
sex Justices ex parte McCarthy (1924), an 
English criminal case that became famous 
for its precedence in establishing the 
principle that the mere appearance of bias 
is sufficient to overturn a judicial decision.
21
4.2  Second Proposition: "What has happened at the  
 Tribunal is far from justice and will be interpreted  
 by observers in the Balkans and beyond as the  
 continuation of war by legal means" (Harland  
 2012).
In addressing a legacy of past abuses, the process of criminal accountability 
can serve several purposes. Prosecutions can provide victims with a sense of 
justice and personal closure - a sense that their grievances have been 
addressed and can now be put to rest. They provide a public forum for the 
judicial confirmation of forensic evidence and historical facts. In a context 
dominated in the past by a culture of impunity, they send a clear signal that 
aggressors and those who attempt to abuse the rights of others will hence-
forth be held accountable. Of equal importance for the purpose of societal 
reconciliation is the fact that trial proceedings individualize responsibility for 
past abuses. It is specific individuals - and not entire ethnic, religious, or 
political groups - that are responsible for the crimes committed. It is those 
individuals who must be held accountable. In this way, international justice 
rejects a culture of collective guilt and retribution that often produces further 
cycles of resentment and violence (Kritz 1997).
 That having been said, it is necessary to acknowledge that war crime 
trials are by nature divisive, particularly in contexts, such as the Balkans, that 
are structurally divided along political, socio-economic, and ethnic lines. 
Rather than serving as means of closure, domestic war crime trials are subject 
to manipulation by political elites and thus can serve to prolong the conflict. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, verbal attacks by senior politicians on 
the War Crimes Chamber of the BiH State Court and other local judicial institu-
tions engaged in investigating and prosecuting war crimes have seriously 
undermined efforts to prosecute such cases (Tolbert 2012).11 These interven-
tions, together with the denial of war crimes – including the genocide in 
Srebrenica in July 1995 – have given rise to a culture of revisionism that is 
dangerous to ignore.
 The acquittals in the Gotovina and Haradinaj cases touch upon this 
unresolved animosity and threaten to amplify the worst political instincts of 
the peoples of the former Yugoslavia: A sense of persecution among Serbs,  
of triumph among Croats, of victimization among Bosnian Muslims, and the 
vindication among Kosovo Albanians of their struggle for liberation as a just 
war in all respects (Ibid.).
 These positions are representative of a particular nationalist sentiment 
and yet each has some basis in fact and each is subject to exaggeration and 
manipulation by politicians on all sides. In this highly charged atmosphere, it 
is hardly surprising that the ICTY has been accused repeatedly over the years 
of being politically motivated in issuing indictments and handing down 
judgments. In point of fact, however, the ICTY set a precedent by ending the 
11 Another example is the separate investi-
gations conducted by the prosecutions of 
both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
concerning events in Dobrovoljacka Street 
in Sarajevo in May 1992, when a convoy 
of Yugoslav Army soldiers was attacked 
and an undetermined number of soldiers 
killed. In this regard, see Mackic & Erjav-
vec (2009). 
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impunity of those senior political and military officials responsible for some of 
the most grievous crimes committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. 
Whatever its weakness as an institution, the ICTY has proven that interna-
tional criminal law is enforceable.
4.3  Third Proposition: "There is no Justice without 
  Injustice"
A brief look at statistics: The ICTY has indicted 161 persons for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of former 
Yugoslavia. By the end of November 2012, trials had been concluded for 130 
accused, while proceedings were still on-going for 31 persons, including the 
cases filed against Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić.
 It is on the domestic level, however, that the vast majority of war crime 
cases will be adjudicated. In Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, the 2008 National 
War Crimes Strategy identified several thousand cases for investigation. The 
strategy envisaged that the most sensitive war crimes cases should be 
completed within seven years, i.e. by 2015, and all others cases within fifteen 
years, i.e. by 2023. Currently, there is a backlog of some 1’320 cases. In a 
recent interview, Serge Brammertz, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, gave a 
pessimistic analysis of the situation, stating that without substantial struc-
tural changes of the current judicial system as well as significant additional 
resources and a clear political commitment from all sides, the war crimes 
strategy would fail (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2012).
 All this must be viewed against the number of victims in the region. The 
total number is unknown. There has been no official fact-finding process to 
accompany the judicial proceedings in the region that might have produced 
reliable statistics. However, years of research conducted by civil society 
organizations have established a basis for reasonable estimates of the 
number of human losses. We can now assume with some certainty, for 
example, that some 100’000 persons from all sides were killed or went missing 
in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina,12 while more than 13’500 persons 
were killed or disappeared in Kosovo (Kosovo Memory Book).13 This number 
does not include other categories of civilian victims, such as refugees and 
IDPs, torture victims, survivors of sexual and gender-based violence, etc.
 Clearly, the numbers do not add up. In no measure can the limited 
number of prosecutions provide satisfaction to such a vast number of victims. 
The ‘justice’ delivered by the ICTY and the domestic courts in the region will 
always be to some extent a symbolic form of justice. A judgment, even if it is a 
conviction, cannot replace the loss of a loved one or restore the mental health 
of a woman or a man affected by the traumatic events of the past. 
 12 On the statistics for human losses in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, see Nettelfield 
(2010). Regarding the recent publication 
of the Bosnian Book of the Dead, as a 
joint effort by the Research and Docu-
mentation Center in Sarajevo and the 
Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade, see 
Fond za Humanitarno Pravo (2013).
13 The statistics on human losses in Kosovo 
are being published under the title of The 
Kosovo Memory Book as a joint project of 
the Pristina and Belgrade offices of the 
Humanitarian Law Center.
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 14 For an explanation of the diagram, see: 
(Sisson 2010).
4.4 Some Reflections on Dealing with the Past 
 in the Balkans after the ICTY Verdicts
The Right to Justice has been the dominant paradigm for addressing grave 
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in the Balkans 
since the establishment of the ICTY in 1993. Nevertheless, it is not and should 
not be the only means of confronting that legacy. The duty of the State in 
providing satisfaction for victims requires a more comprehensive and inclusive 
approach to Dealing with the Past, as illustrated in the diagram in Figure I 
below.14 The need for a holistic approach in the Balkans, which includes 
initiatives in the field of truth-seeking, reparations, and institutional reform in 
addition to the pursuit of justice, is all the more evident in light of the contro-
versy following the recent ICTY judgments.
 One of the most important non-judicial initiatives is the civil society 
coalition to establish a regional commission, known as ReCom, to determine 
the facts about war crimes and other grave breaches of human rights in the 
former Yugoslavia in the period from 1991 to 2001. The proposed commission 
would compile a list of all those killed and missing during the wars and an 
inventory of prison camps and other detention centres. In addition, it would 
organize public hearings with the object of acknowledging the injustices 
suffered by the victims of the conflict across the region. The ReCom coalition 
submitted a draft statute for ReCom together with a petition with some 
545’000 signatures of support to the Presidents of all the successor states of 
former Yugoslavia in June 2011. Recently, the initiative gained new momentum 
when the Presidents of Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia announced the 
appointment of personal envoys to ReCom (ReCom 2013).
 A regional fact-finding commission would supplement, but not neces-
sarily replace national truth-seeking efforts. Important steps in this regard 
have been undertaken on the state level by the governments of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a working group under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Human Rights and 
Refugees has now produced a national strategy for transitional justice with a 
focus on local truth-seeking initiatives and on memorialization. In Kosovo, the 
Office of the Prime Minister has just established an Inter-Ministerial Working 
Group, including the involvement of civil society representatives, tasked with 
the mandate to develop a national strategy for Dealing with the Past and 
reconciliation. 
 Other significant developments on a regional level pertain to the reset-
tlement of refugees and displaced persons and to the search for missing 
persons. In April 2012, an international conference of donors held in Sarajevo 
with the participation of the governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Montenegro, and Serbia took the decision to establish a joint Regional Housing 
Program to assist the voluntary return and reintegration of some 74’000 
refugees and displaced persons in the region. In October 2012, 
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representatives of the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian governments agreed to 
sign bilateral agreements on cooperation concerning the search for missing 
persons and to create a common database for all missing people in the region 
in view of the fact that many of the relatives of the missing no longer live in 
their places of origin, where the disappearances took place. 
 The significance of these initiatives lies in the recognition that retrib-
utive justice alone cannot provide adequate redress to victims nor can it 
satisfy the duty of the State to remember what happened in the past in order 
to prevent violations from recurring in the future. Almost two decades after 
the events concerned, the States in the region have still not fulfilled their 
obligations in this regard. 
 "Dealing with a legacy of serious human rights violations is one of the 
most difficult challenges facing post-conflict societies. No standard model 
exists for Dealing with the Past. International norms and standards with their 
attendant mechanisms are still evolving and must be tested and re-tested in 
practice. But this much is known: In order to re-establish fundamental trust 
and accountability in society, there is a need to acknowledge publicly the 
abuses that have taken place, to hold those responsible who have planned, 
ordered, and committed such violations, and to rehabilitate and compensate 
victims. This process of Dealing with the Past is a necessary precondition for 
the establishment of the rule of law and the pursuit of reconciliation".  
(Sisson 2010:11).
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